A Few Thoughts on “If a Tree Falls in a Roadway . . . .” by Eggert, David
Washington and Lee Law Review
Volume 76 | Issue 1 Article 14
5-24-2019
A Few Thoughts on “If a Tree Falls in a Roadway . . .
.”
David Eggert
Washington and Lee University School of Law, eggertd@wlu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/wlulr
Part of the State and Local Government Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Student Notes Colloquium is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington and Lee Law Review at Washington & Lee University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington and Lee Law Review by an authorized editor of Washington &
Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact christensena@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation




A Few Thoughts on “If a Tree Falls in a 
Roadway . . . .” 
David S. Eggert* 
Table of Contents 
 I. Introduction ...................................................................... 563 
  A. Natural versus Artificial ........................................... 565 
  B. The No Duty Rule ...................................................... 567 
  C. The Tri-partite Duties of a Landowner for Injuries 
   on the Land ................................................................ 567 
  D. The Rights/Obligations Distinction .......................... 568 
 II. Placing the Issue in the Constellation of Virginia Law . 569 
 III. The Arguments for Imposing a Duty on Road 
  Maintainers ...................................................................... 571 
 I. Introduction      
I was interested, but dubious, when my student Ian 
McElhaney came to me with his incipient Note idea to write about 
trees. Devoting a semester to studying and writing about the 
tort- law treatment of trees falling on Virginia roads seemed a 
quixotic quest. It didn’t seem like one of the burning legal issues of 
the day. Decidedly low-tech in an age where the internet and 
related technologies—or hot-button political or social issues—are 
all the rage. Nevertheless, Mr. McElhaney’s original idea has 
taken root and flourished, and merits careful consideration.  
As Mr. McElhaney carefully put his note together, it became 
clear to me that this seemingly small issue condensed into one 
focused pressure point a number of important issues—the 
purposes of law, the appropriate place of courts in the 
modernization of ancient legal principles, and the peculiar position 
of the Commonwealth of Virginia in all of this. The Note also had 
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the advantage of having arisen organically from Mr. McElhaney’s 
own legal experience with the issue of liability for fallen trees.  
The result is a real contribution to the development of Virginia 
law on this issue—an issue well positioned to for Virginia Supreme 
Court review in the next few years. The crux of Mr. McElhaney’s 
note is to examine the current state of Virginia law on liability for 
injuries caused by falling trees and to recommend that Virginia 
adopt a common-sense rule that general responsibility for 
maintaining a roadway encompasses a collateral duty to ensure 
that the roadway is reasonably safe from falling trees. The Note 
starts with the premise that the Virginia Supreme Court fairly 
recently, in 2012, addressed the issue of falling-tree liability. In 
Cline v. Dunlora S., LLC,1 the Court hewed to the traditional (but 
increasingly antiquated) rule that a private landowner has no duty 
to inspect his property for rotting or otherwise unsafe trees at risk 
for falling on the roadway. A spirited dissent by now Chief Justice 
Lemons would have embraced the modern approach of imposing at 
least some sort of duty on such a landowner. In any event, both the 
dissent and the majority noted that the majority’s refusal to budge 
from the traditional rule insulating landowners presaged no 
judgment on the separate issue of whether road maintainers might 
sometimes be liable for injuries caused by falling trees. Mr. 
McElhaney’s Note takes up that challenge and argues that 
Virginia should adopt “road-maintainer negligence liability” for 
injuries caused by falling trees.2 Along the way, he treats some 
salient issues of sovereign immunity, since “road-maintainers” 
tend to be government entities. 
Because Mr. McElhaney’s excellent note itself thoroughly 
canvasses the various potential approaches to liability for 
falling- tree injury and the existing law, I will confine my brief 
remarks to (1) the background legal context that got us to where 
we are on falling-tree liability; (2) how this peculiar issue fits into 
Virginia’s general approach to the law; and (3) some thoughts on 
Mr. McElhaney’s reasoning and ultimate conclusions in urging 
liability for road maintainers. 
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I. Background of the Traditional Falling-Tree Rule 
The traditional common law rule imposes no duty upon the 
owner of land to inspect and maintain trees on his property to 
protect those on the road from injury to person or property. This 
traditional rule flows logically from several broader doctrines long 
central to tort law. Yet all of these doctrines have—at least in most 
jurisdictions—narrowed significantly in the last several decades. 
The question is whether the immunity of private landowners 
should narrow along with them. These various doctrines 
undergirding the law against landowner tree-falling liability 
include (1) the general notion that the law should not impose 
liability for naturally-occurring events (what I will call the 
“Natural-Versus-Artificial-Conditions” Doctrine); (2) the so-called 
“No Duty” Rule, under which a person generally has no duty to 
rescue another either from natural conditions or from the 
negligence or other wrongdoing of a third party; (3) the general 
doctrine that landowners owe diminished duties in tort to those on 
their land (meaning that they were until recently largely exempt 
from the general duty of reasonable care imposed under the 
emerging law of negligence upon most human activity other than 
“landowning”); and (4) the general view that property ownership 
confers “rights” as against society, more than “responsibilities” 
toward society. I will briefly discuss the background and 
development of each of these doctrines in turn. 
A. Natural versus Artificial 
The traditional “no-liability-for-falling-trees rule” can be seen 
as one manifestation of the general reluctance to hold individuals 
accountable for natural events. For example, consider the so-called 
“Act of God defense” for inability to perform a contract: a humble 
individual cannot reasonably be held to account for what are 
regarded as the vicissitudes of nature or the hand of God. As 
applied to trees, the idea is that a landowner does nothing to 
disturb the natural course of nature simply by owning land 
containing trees. Thus, the landowner has no obligation to protect 
others from the natural process of trees decaying, rotting, and 
falling.  
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The common law often distinguished between natural 
conditions (as to which there was a lesser duty or no duty at all to 
protect others) and so-called artificial (or manmade) conditions. 
For example, the classic torts case of Rylands v. Fletcher3 imposed 
liability upon a landowner for flooding a mineshaft—a manmade 
structure—on his land and thus injuring an adjacent landowner’s 
property. The case is a watershed in the development of strict 
liability. Lord Cairns relied heavily upon the 
Natural-Versus-Artificial-Conditions Doctrine:  
The D might lawfully have used [the land] for any purpose in 
which it might, in the ordinary course of the enjoyment of the 
land, be used, and if, in what I may term the natural use of that 
land, there had been any accumulation of water, and if, by the 
operation of the laws of nature that accumulation of water had 
passed off onto the Plaintiff’s land, the plaintiff could not have 
complained that the result had taken place.”4 
In other words, it is a plaintiff’s own job to protect himself against 
natural processes; it isn’t his neighbor’s job to do it for him. On the 
other hand, according to Lord Cairn’s if—as was the case in 
Rylands—the defendants had “not stopped at the natural use of 
their close [a fancy word for land]” and had instead used it for a 
so- called “non-natural use” then the D did so “at his peril.”5 
Another example of this natural/unnatural distinction is the 
so-called “attractive nuisance” doctrine, which holds that certain 
conditions on property that are attractive to children supersede the 
normal trespasser-unfriendly rules for landowner liability 
discussed below.6 This exception is said to apply only to artificial 
conditions on the land—not to naturally occurring attractive 
nuisances. Once again, the law gives the landowner a pass with 
respect to what can be described as naturally occurring conditions: 
accordingly, liability might hinge on whether a child dies in a 
swimming pool (artificial—liability) as opposed to a native lake 
(natural-no liability).  
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B. The No Duty Rule 
One of the leading torts professors in the country—indeed one 
of the leading legal polymaths of his generation—is Richard 
Epstein of the University of Chicago. In his hornbook Torts, 
Professor Epstein writes: “The basic rationale for this rule—by 
which he means the no-liability-for-falling-trees rule—“stems from 
the general proposition that individuals do not owe affirmative 
duties of care to strangers.”7 Epstein, following his customary 
law- and-economics approach, explains the traditional rule in 
economic terms: “The economic logic behind this position seems 
quite strong. Natural events come in all shapes and sizes. The costs 
of predicting and controlling those events are quite high and the 
gains from taking precautions are generally quite low.”8 In other 
words, the traditional no-liability-for-trees rule is a sort of shadow 
companion to the general no-duty rule—that we don’t generally 
have a duty to come to the rescue of others. Importantly, Professor 
Epstein— unlike the Virginia Supreme Court—uses the tree-rule 
as a “limit” on the traditional no-duty rule. His hornbook embraces 
the modern position that it does sometimes make economic sense 
to impose a duty on landowners to take precautionary measures 
for basic tree safety/integrity inspection. Specifically, he uses his 
same trademarked law-and-economics approach to endorse the 
emerging tendency of courts (in states other than Virginia) to 
impose inspection duties upon landlords in well-trafficked or urban 
locales. The idea is that the cost-benefit ration changes in densely 
populated urban settings where tree falls are more likely to inflict 
in jury: The traditional rule, by contrast, developed in an historical 
context where most land was rural, where landowners owned vast 
tracts of forest, and where it was impractical and inefficient to 
impose expensive inspection and repair duties on landowners. 
C. The Tri-partite Duties of a Landowner for Injuries on the Land 
As every first-year torts student no doubt recalls, the 
traditional common law was very slow to apply negligence 
standard to landowners when persons were injured on the land. 
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Instead, something approaching the reasonable standard of care 
was requires only with respect to business invitees. Most persons 
on the land of others—licensees and trespassers—were not entitled 
to “reasonable care” and enjoyed a much lower standard of care.9 
Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the law also imposed a low 
standard with respect to protecting those not on the land from 
hazards emanating from the land—such as falling trees. But the 
clear nationwide trend in the law—initiated by the California 
Supreme Court in Rowland v. Christian,10 and now the majority 
position—is to impose either a generalized standard of reasonable 
care for landowners, or (at a minimum) require reasonable care for 
both licensees and invitees.11 
D. The Rights/Obligations Distinction 
The traditional approach to “property” law in the United 
States is that it gives the owners of property “rights” as to their 
property as against the rest of the world—the quintessential 
“bundle of sticks,” including such rights as the ability to use, 
transfer, exclude, and destroy. In recent years, however, scholars 
(and a few courts) have started to stress the obligations of property 
owners.12 And the law obviously imposes some such 
obligations— for example, pollution clean-up under CERCLA, 
property taxes, substantial limitation of rights in deference to the 
“public interest” without just compensation, etc. Some identify a 
national paradigm shift away from the concept of property as 
primarily a bundle of rights in favor of a more of balanced approach 
that supplements the concept of rights with community-oriented, 
stewardship, responsibilities and obligations. In that context, one 
might think that it’s only a matter of time before either the courts 
                                                                                                     
 9.  See, e.g., DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 591–608 (2000). 
 10.  443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1969). 
 11.  Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 
(1959) (“Through this semantic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and 
with hesitation, towards imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty 
of reasonable care in all the circumstances.”). 
 12.  JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT 18 (2000); Alexander, The Social 
Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2000). 
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or perhaps the legislature undo the traditional 
“no-duty-for-falling-trees” doctrine. 
The shift in all of these doctrines that undergirded the 
traditional rule that a landowner has no liability for, or duty with 
respect to, trees that fall from his land on to adjacent roadways 
suggests that the time is now ripe to reconsider and replace the 
ancient rule. As the Note observes, many jurisdictions have done 
just that. Virginia has not. 
II. Placing the Issue in the Constellation of Virginia Law 
Having taught a number of law school classes at a 
Virginia- based law school, my ineluctable conclusion is that 
Virginia courts tend to move very slowly and conservatively. For 
example, on the issue of landowner liability in tort for conditions 
on their land,13 Virginia is one of the minority of states that still 
hews to the traditional tri-partite rule that landowners owe a 
reduced duty of care (or none at all) to persons injured on their 
land.14 
As noted above, in 2012, the Virginia Supreme Court affirmed 
in Dunlora the traditional rule that a landowner has no duty to 
protect motorists on adjacent roads from falling trees on his land. 
But even in this respect, Virginia extends protection to landowners 
well beyond other states that retain the traditional rule. Other 
states recognizing the traditional approach apply it as a 
“no-duty-to-inspect” rule. The notion is that a landowner need not 
undergo the expense of regularly checking to make sure that his 
trees are not a danger to passing motorists. But these states 
generally hold that “[i]f the landowner actually knows that a tree 
has become a danger to those on the highway, he is obliged to use 
reasonable care to deal with the risk. . . .”15 Not so in Virginia. 
Dunlora suggests that even if a landowner knows full well that he 
has a rotten tree that is likely to collapse on the road with the next 
                                                                                                     
 13. Supra Part II.C. 
 14. See RGR, LLC v. Settle, 764 S.E.2d 8, 33 (Va. 2014) (noting the desire to 
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trespassers). 
 15. Dobbs, supra note 9, at 589. 
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stiff wind gust, he has absolutely no tort duty to do anything about 
it.16 
And there are other areas in tort where Virginia law lags most 
of the nation. For example, Virginia is one of only four states in the 
nation that still totally precludes a contributorily-negligent 
plaintiff from recovering even a dime in tort against a negligent 
tortfeasor.17 Virginia is also one of a handful of states that still 
applies the full-fledged traditional assumption of risk doctrine in 
tort.18 Moreover, Virginia is one of the only states in the country 
that still applies the concept of charitable immunity in tort.19 And 
it’s not just tort law. In property law, Virginia is one of about only 
fifteen states that still recognizes the old-fashioned tenancy by the 
entirety (and also one of the still-smaller number of states 
permitting that estate to fully insulate property from creditors of 
just one spouse).20 
Virginia is one of only eight states in the nation that still apply 
the largely-defunct eighty-five-year-old First Restatement of 
Conflict of Laws (note that the Second Restatement was completed 
some 50 years ago, and the reporters are busily working on a 
Third). Virginia thus employs the largely discredited notion of 
so- called “vested rights.”21 This approach—inspired by “natural 
law” thinking—was popular in the late nineteenth century and 
                                                                                                     
 16.  Cline v. Dunlora South, LLC, 726 S.E.2d 14, 17–18 (Va. 2012). 
 17.  Rascher v. Friend, 689 S.E.2d 661, 664–65 (Va. 2010). 
 18.  Nelson v. Great E. Resort Mgmt., Inc., 574 S.E.2d 277, 280 (Va. 2003) 
(“[T]he doctrine of assumption of risk that operates to bar recovery by an injured 
party where the nature and extent of the risk were fully appreciated and 
the risk was voluntarily incurred by that party. Assumption of risk is an 
affirmative defense in Virginia.”) (internal citation omitted). 
 19.  Ola v. YMCA of S. Hampton Roads, Inc., 621 S.E.2d 70, 72 (Va. 2005) 
(“The doctrine of charitable immunity ‘is firmly embedded in the law of this 
Commonwealth and has become a part of the general public policy of the State.’” 
(quoting Memorial Hosp., Inc. v. Oakes, 108 S.E.2d 388, 396 (Va. 1959))). 
 20.  Evans v. Evans, 772 S.E.2d 576, 580 (Va. 2015) (“[C]onsistent with this 
restriction on alienability, no creditor of only one spouse can attach property held 
by both spouses as tenants by the entirety.”). 
 21. Holland v. Bd. of Supervisors, 441 S.E.2d 20, 21–22 (discussing whether 
the plaintiff “identif[ied] a significant official governmental act that would permit 
[him] to conduct a use on [his] property that otherwise would not have been 
allowed” to prove he had a vested right); Vested-rights Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“identify a significant official governmental act that 
would permit the landowner to conduct a use on its property that otherwise would 
not have been allowed.”). 
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early twentieth centuries, and was already beginning to fall out of 
fashion in many jurisdictions by the time the First Restatement 
went to print nearly a century ago. It has been abandoned by 
virtually all other states for a good half century. 
When it comes to procedure, Virginia is one of the only states 
in the country that does not permit class actions. In addition, it 
modernized its summary judgment rules to permit the use of 
affidavits—something the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have 
permitted for more than seventy-five years—only a few years ago.  
On the issue of collateral estoppel (or issue preclusion), the 
Commonwealth still applies the old-fashioned issue preclusion rule 
that demands privity and rejects offensive, non-mutual use of 
collateral estoppel. The United States Supreme Court rejected that 
approach for federal law purposes in the Blonder Tongue22 case 
nearly half a century ago and only a handful states still join 
Virginia in applying the traditional approach.23 
All this is not to say that Virginia’s positions on all these issues 
are necessarily wrong—although good arguments could be made 
that many of them are. Much could be said for the virtues of 
awaiting legislative action before altering time-tested doctrines 
and rules, even if the legislature—seemingly in deference to the 
judiciary—shows no sign of action. But the larger point is that 
Virginia moves quite slowly—even more so than most other 
states—in changing long-established legal rules. So, it is unlikely 
that the Supreme Court will revisit its decision to retain the 
traditional no-liability-for-falling-trees-rule anytime soon. And 
thus, the Note is right to look elsewhere for a potential duty to 
make the roads safe from falling trees.  
III. The Arguments for Imposing a Duty on Road Maintainers 
My final remarks will focus on Mr. McElhaney’s proposed 
solution to the above problems by taking up the hint in Dunlora 
and imposing liability—not on landowners—but on 
“road- maintaining” entities (normally government). At the outset, 
I note one minor disagreement with the argument in the Note. The 
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 23.  See id. at 349–50 (stating that mutuality estoppel is antiquated and no 
longer relevant in American society). 
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Note suggests that liability should be imposed upon the road 
maintainers because Dunlora refused to impose liability upon 
landowners, thus “leav[ing] the road-maintaining entity as the 
only entity potentially liable for injuries resulting from treefalls in 
the roadway.”24. This argument seems to put the cart before the 
horse and assume that someone must be liable in tort to any 
motorist injured by a falling tree. Of course, the other possibility is 
that no one is liable to such injured motorists and that they will 
have to bear the costs of their own injuries. Many injuries suffered 
by persons in our society do not result in tort liability for anyone; 
it’s simply a misnomer to imply that the mere fact of injury 
demands a defendant somewhere who can pay. 
More broadly, however, the Note’s arguments for imposing 
liability upon road maintainers is strong. The Note urges that 
observe how this deals with the two principal rationales for the 
traditional approach of no-liability for landowners. First, this 
approach neatly circumvents the no-duty rule. It’s plausible to 
characterize the non-liability of a landowner (who is after all just 
owning land but not engaging in a dangerous activity) as a function 
of the no-duty-to rescue rule: he simply failed to “come to the 
rescue” of motorists that endangered by rotting trees. But it’s not 
plausible similarly to characterize the road-builder/road 
maintainer as a non-actor that the law is trying to conscript to 
come to the rescue. On the contrary, the road-maintainer is 
undeniably involved in an activity—providing and maintaining 
roads. Imposing a duty to inspect for dangerous trees is thus just 
one way of insisting that one engaged in providing and 
maintaining roads do so with reasonable care for the safety of 
motorists. In this respect, demanding reasonable tree inspection is 
no different in principle from demanding reasonable guardrails, 
reasonable pothole repair, reasonable bridges, and 
reasonably- operating stoplights. As the Virginia Supreme Court 
noted in Dunlora, “[t]he duty of the [public entity that maintains 
the highway] is to perform a positive act in the preparation and 
preservation of a sufficient traveled way.”25  
In the same way, shifting liability to the state deals with the 
second rationale for the traditional no-liability-for-falling-trees 
                                                                                                     
 24.  McElhaney, supra note 2, at 549. 
 25. Dunlora, 726 S.E.2d at 18. 
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rule—the distinction between natural and artificial conditions. 
When we look at the road builder/maintainer, the issue is whether 
the artificial condition—the road—is safe. The focus need not be on 
the “natural” condition of a rotting tree. The “artificial condition” 
of the roadway introduced into the natural environment imposes a 
duty to guard against dangers to those on the roadway from falling 
trees. 
So taking up Dunlora’s suggestion of government liability and 
running with it was an excellent idea. The problem is that—like 
many good ideas—it introduced another potential Pandora’s Box 
of problems, specifically this associated with governmental 
immunity in tort. But I will not belabor those here, as Mr. 
McElhaney has addressed them in his Note. Indeed, the morass of 
Virginia governmental immunity law—resulting in widely varied 
standards for state, county and municipal liability and 
hard-to-reconcile decisions on the distinction between sovereign 
and commercial activities—is due for a revamping of its own that 
extends far beyond the falling-tree doctrine. We’ll leave that for 
another day. 
